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WILLS-EFFECT OF TESTAMENTARY DESIGNATION OF
COUNSEL FOR ThE EXECUTOR
The general common law rule is that a provision in a will selecting
a person as attorney for the executor of the will is not binding on the
executor and is of no legal effect'. The various reasons given for
this rule may be stated as follows:
(1) The responsibility for the administration of the estate lies
with the executor and not with the attorney. It is the duty of the
executor when legal aid is necessary, to hire such attorneys as in his
opinion and judgment are best fitted to advise him, and who will be
of greatest benefit to the administration of the estate. The position
of executor involves some discretion and a great deal of responsibility.
It would be unreasonable to tie the hands of the executor in exercising
this discretion as far as employment of counsel is concerned.
(2) The relationship of attorney and client is a highly personal
and confidential one. It would be unwise to impose arbitrarily on
the executor an attorney contrary to his preferences.
(3)
There is no such office as attorney for the estate. Any counsel hired to aid in probate matters is the counsel of the executor, and
the executor is personally liable for the services rendered by such
counsel. It is true that the executor will be reimbursed from the estate
if the aid of counsel is actually needed in administering the estate; but
the fact remains, the primary liability is that of the executor 2.
(4) If the attorney is derelict in performing his duties, the executor is liable to third parties injured by the attorney's acts, as he is to
distributees under the will who suffer from the attorney's mistakes 3.
(5)
If the executor himself causes injury to third parties or to
the beneficiaries under the will, he is liable to such third parties and
beneficiaries even through the executor acted under advice of counsel4 .
The language used by the testator in appointing the attorney does
not seem to affect the rulings of the courts on this question. In Conlan
v. Sullivan the court said the executor is not bound to employ an
attorney appointed by the testator, even though the will uses such
I This rule applies in the United States: 1 Page on Wills, 109 (1941); and in
England, 1 Page on Wills, 108 (1941). 166 A.L.R. 491 contains further authority for this statement. In 41 Harv. L. Rev. 709 at 719 (1928), it is stated, "accordingly it would seem that cases which universally hold that a trustee or
executor is not bound to employ an attorney designated by the testator are clearly correct."

2

Estate of Arneberg, 184 Wis. 570, 200 N. W. 557 (1924) ; In re Ogiers Estate,

101 Calif. 381, 35 Pac. 900 (1894); Young v. Alexander, 84 Tenn. 108 (1885).
3 In re Ogiers Estate, 101 Calif. 381, 35 Pac. 900 (1894) ; Matter of Caldwell, 188
N.Y. 115, 80 N.E. 663 (1907) ; Young v. Alexander, 84 Tenn. 108 (1885) ; 41

Harv. L. Rev. 709 at 719 (1928).
4 Young v. Alexander, 84 Tenn. 108 (1885) ; 41 Harv. L. Rev. 709 at 719 (1928).
5 280 Ill. App. 332 (1935).
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words as "direct," "command," or "appoint." This statement was
dicta in the case, but was made after a very thorough and well reasoned
analysis of the decided cases on the question. Language to the same
effect as that used in the Conlan case was used by the court in Re Estate
of Lachmond6. This last case involved a mutual and reciprocal will
made pursuant to a contract between the testator and the executrix
of the will. The court said that even in the case of mutual, reciprocal
wills, a testamentary appointment of counsel vested no rights in the
counsel.
It has been urged in some of the decided cases that because of the
relationship between the testator and the person appointed as counsel,
or because of the language used by the testator in designating the
person as counsel, the designation should be considered as a bequest
to the person so designated. Such arguments have been rejected by
the cases. In Young v. Alexander7 the attorney was a nephew of the
testator. This relationship was referred to in the will, yet the court
said the appointment was not binding on the executor. The testator
in Conlan v. Sullivan8 requested the executors to employ "my friend,
Frank A. O'Donnell" as their attorney. The court held this direction
not to be binding on the executor. The language used by the testator in In
re Thistlewaite9 was in effect "I direct and desire" that my friend,
Charles McLouth, have charge of the legal aspects of my estate and
that he advise my executors. McLouth claimed that this language designated him as the only person to be employed as counsel for the
executor and imposed a trust on the estate in his favor, for the value
of the legal services that vwould be rendered in administering the estate.
The court in rejecting this contention pointed to the absurd results
such a theory would involve: namely that if this trust were imposed,
the executors would have to retain McLouth as their counsel even
though he became incompetent and unable to perform the legal services
required in administering the estate, or else pay him the value of the
legal services required and employ another attorney at their own personal expense. The court refused to construe the language in the
will so as to effect such a result. The problem involved in answering
the argument suggested in this paragraph is one of construction of
the terms of the will. The case of In re Thistlewaite0 indicates the
courts will require a clear and unambiguous expression by the testator
that he intends to establish a legacy in favor of the designated counsel
before a testamentary designation of counsel will be construed to be
such a legacy.
Pac. (2d) 748 (Ore., 1946).
784 Tenn. 108 (1885).
8280 Ill. App. 332 (1935).
9 104 N. Y. Supp. 264 (1907).
10 104 N. Y. Supp. 264 (1907).
6 170
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This argument that the designation of a person as counsel makes
him a legatee under the will may be handled in another way by regarding the "bequest" to him as a conditional one, the condition being
the rendering of legal services to the estate. If the executor objects
to the person named as counsel by the testator for any reason, the
person so named can not fulfill the condition to obtaining his bequest,
and the bequest will not be given to him.
In Estate of Arneberg" an attorney for the administratrix sought
to establish a lien against an estate for legal services rendered the
administratrix in settling the estate. The Wisconsin Court has indicated
the rule to be that the estate of a deceased person is not subject to a
lien for the payment of compensation for legal services rendered in the
administration of the estate unless the administrator is personally insolvent or financially unable to pay for such services1 2. The primary
liability is upon the administrator. To avoid these cases the attorney in
the Arneberg case cited section 3808 (a), Wisconsin Statutes, which
provides:
"Whenever a firm or corporation of any kind is named as
administrator or executor of an estate, he or she who is nearest
of kin and who receives any interest in the estate, and if there
be no bequest of any kind, then the party receiving the largest
amount or interest from the estate, shall name the attorney who
shall represent the estate in all proceedings of any kind or nature, unless good cause be shown before the court why this
3
should not be done."'
The attorney argued that this statute established a new legislative
policy which changed the status of an attorney employed to perform
legal services in the probate of an estate from that of an attorney for
the executor to that of an attorney for the estate. The court in answer
to this proposition pointed out that the statute was only applicable
when firms and corporations are named executors or administrators;
that this was clearly a modification of the general rule which allows
the personal representative to employ his own counsel; and that since
the section was only applicable in instances where executors or administrators were firms or corporations, it emphasized the right of all
other executors and administrators to employ counsel of their own
choice. It would appear that this case may be interpreted as an approval by the Wisconsin Supreme Court of the general doctrine that testamentary designation of counsel for executors is of no legal effect. It
184 Wis. 570, 200 N. W. 557 (1924).
12 McLaughlin v. Winner, 63 Wis. 120, 23 N. W. 402 (1885) ; Mfiller v. Tracy, 86
Wis. 330 at 333, 56 N.W. 866 (1893) ; Wiesmann v. Daniels, 114 Wis. 240 at 243,
90 N.W. 162 (1902).
3 This statute is now sec. 310,25, Wis. Stat. (1945), the material part of which is
identical with 3808 (a) quoted above.
1
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indicates that in the absence of controlling statutes, executors may
choose their own legal advisers.
The author's research indicates Louisiana as the only jurisdiction
enforcing a testamentary designation of counsel. Rivet v. Battistella4
illustrates the reasoning of the Louisiana court on the problem 15. The
court in that case acknowledged the general rule elsewhere to be that
testamentary designation of counsel is opposed to a public policy which
favors freedom of choice of the executor in this regard; but stated
that in its view, such designation was nothing more than a provision
for the manner in which the estate was to be administered, a matter
the Louisiana court stated to be lawfully within the control of the
testator. Act number 45 of the Laws of Louisiana for 1902 provided
that when a bank is appointed executor of a will, the designation of
counsel by the testator or the selection of counsel by the heirs will bind
the bank. The court seized on this statute as being indicative of the
policy of the state in allowing testamentary control over the appointment of counsel, and extended the power of the testator to appoint
counsel for the executor to include those instances where private persons were named as executors. The holding of the Louisiana court, it
is submitted, should not derogate from the majority rule on the effect
of testamentary appointment of counsel. The Louisiana decision is
based on a statute which, in express language, commits that state to
the policy of giving effect to testamentary designation of counsel for
the executor. All other courts dealing with the problem in the absence
of legislative declaration have held such designation to be of no effect.
Section 310.25, Wisconsin Statutes (1945)16, does indicate a legislative

intent to permit control over the discretion of executors in their choice
of counsel, but this legislative intent is limited to allowing control over
the executor's choice only where the executor is a firm or a corporation' 7 . Furthermore, Sec. 310.25 gives the right of choice of counsel
to the heirs of the testator only, and not to the testator himself.
Section 310.25 is the only Wisconsin statute affecting the executor's
right to choose his own legal advisers. Estate of Arneberg8 is the only
Wisconsin case interpreting the statute. This case sheds no light on
the meaning of the statute further than to limit its scope and legal
effect to instances where the executor is a firm or a corporation. It
would seem clear that section 310.25 would be applicable when there
is no designation of counsel by the testator. If, however, the testator
designates counsel, it may be urged that since the established policy of
14167 La. 766, 120 So. 289 (1929).

15 There are several Louisiana cases that affirm the Rivet case, but these later
cases do not discuss the reasoning or principles established in the Rivet case.
16 See footnote (13) supra.
'7 Estate of Arneberg, 184 Wis. 570, 200 N. W. 557 (1924).
18 184 Wis. 570, 200 N. W. 557 (1924).
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the Wisconsin Court is to give effect to the intent of the testator10 , the
statute should not be construed to include instances where the testator
has designated counsel. However, the cases cited in the above footnote
are almost uniform in placing some limits on the general policy of
complete enforcement of the testator's expressed intent. The following
quotation from Upham v. Plankington suggests the nature of such
limitations:
"Every person of mature years and sound mind has a right
to make his own will, conformable to statutory regulations designed to safeguard that right and not violating any written or
any unwritten law2 ° , and to have that will carried out according
to his intent."
The common law policy against allo'ing testamentary designation of
counsel must be considered a part of the unwritten law referred to
by the court. In view of the disposition made by the courts of testamentary designations of counsel for executors, it is submitted that the
construction of the statute in question should not be affected by the
presence of a testamentary designation.
Section 310.25 provides that the counsel designated by the heirs
shall handle legal problems for the estate "unless good cause be shown
before the court why this should not be done." What is "good cause"
within the meaning of this statute? Judging from the wording of
the statute, it seems to have been enacted to give the heirs of a deceased person the power to appoint counsel for the executor in the
instances enumerated in the statute. The reason for granting this
power to the heirs probably was to give them a chance to appoint a
person who will be in a position to protect and look after the interests
of the heirs when a firm or corporation is named as executor. It is
submitted that the statute should not be construed so as to give this
same power to the testator when there is no express language in the
statute conferring this power on the testator. It would seem that the
public policy against testamentary designation of counsel prevents the
testator from appointing counsel for the executor, and section 310.25
prevents the executor from choosing its own counsel when the executor is a firm or corporation. The power to choose counsel is in that
instance given to the heirs. A clause in the statute making an exception
to this power of the heirs when good cause is shown should not be
construed to create a power of testamentary appointment. This argumen is given added credence by the canon of statutory interpretation
19 Will of Dardis, 135 Wis. 457 at 463, 115 N. W. 332 (1908) ; Will of Rice, 150
Wis. 401, 136 N. W. 956 (1912); Upham v. Plankinton, 152 Wis. 275, 140 N.

W. 5 (1913) ; Will of Schaefer, 207 Wis. 404 at 409, 241 N. W. 382 (1932);
Will of Stack, 217 Wis. 94 at 98, 258 N. W. 324 (1935).

20 Italics the author's.
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that all statutes in derogation of the common law shall be strictly
construed. The clause creating the "good cause" exception to the power
of the heirs to appoint counsel was probably intended to cover instances
where the counsel appointed by the heirs was not capable of handling
the position to which he was appointed.
If the legislature enacted 310.25 for the sole purpose of preventing
a monopoly of the probate business by counsel appointed by corporate
executors, an argument might be made that the testamentary designation of counsel is "good cause" within the meaning of the statute,
and its acceptance would allow counsel designated by the testator to
assert a right to act as counsel for the estate. This argument is subject to the weakness that testamentary designation even when found
in a mutual, reciprocal will made pursuant to a contract vests no rights
in the designated counsel 1 . If the counsel is given no right by the designation in the will, it is diffcult to see how a statement in a statute, the
meaning of which is not clear, can be construed, in derogation of a well
established common law principle, to give the designated counsel any
rights.
It might be argued that 310.25 violates the Fourteenth Amendment
to the Federal Constitution by depriving persons of liberty and property
without due process of law. In the instances where the statute is operative, it deprives the testator of the power to appoint counsel for the
executor; it deprives the designated counsel of the right to act as counsel; and it imposes on the executor a counsel chosen by the heirs of
the testator. To answer this argument as far as the testator and the
person designated as counsel are concerned, we need only consider
that at common law the testator had no power to appoint counsel, and
the counsel obtained no right from such appointment. An executor is
free to accept or decline his appointment as executor. This freedom
of choice by the executor would seem to refute any claim that his
liberty has been invaded by the statute. Furthermore, the legislature
is entitled to adopt reasonable regulations governing the administration
of estates. Section 310.25, it is submitted, is a reasonable legislative
regulation imposed on corporate executors for the protection of the
interests of the heirs, and to prevent a monopoly of the probate business by counsel appointed by such executors.
In summary then, testamentary designation of counsel is generally
of no legal effect. The executors and administrators are free to choose
their own counsel in the absence of contrary legislation. In Wisconsin
when the executor or administrator is a firm or corporation, the heirs
of the deceased shall, as provided in 310.25, choose the counsel who will
perform the legal services for the estate "unless good cause be shown
21 Re Estate of Lachmond, 170 Pac. (2d) 748 (Ore., 1946).
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before the court why this should not be done." It is suggested the
good cause referred to in the statute includes only cases where the
counsel appointed by the heirs is incapable of performing the legal
services required by the estate.
-EDmUND

W. POWELL

